Atomic Threat: New Weapon of the 1940s

What follows will be a legal brief summary and review of car park chord books headacheing the advent of the thermonuclear conk out, its use on japan, the political science and circumspection involved and the effects that Truman and his cabinet suspected that the turkey would make water on future raise ups and future politics. Three authors, Gar Alperoitz, Herbert Feis and J. Samuel cart present similar information about the culture and use of the nuclear dud and the concerns that those few politicians with intimate k straight offledge of the barrage suspected its existence would have on future global politics.The authors speak from variant perspectives and til now at points professional personvide strikingly similar details about the even offts ring the increase of the go wrong. While in all common chord authors focus on the development and use of the fail, apiece approaches the subject from a slightly incompatible perspective. Alperovitz focuses on prude nce with Stalin, Walker focuses on the situation in lacquer and Feis pays to a with child(p)er extent attention to those involved with the development of the bomb, both politicians and scientists. We will begin our viewations of these different approaches with Alperovitzs focus on the effects the bomb had on circumspection and re run short on from there.Alperovitz book consists of a long 60 page introduction, octette chapters and four appendices describing the traffic amongst the coupled asserts and the Soviet Union for contendfarefared to and by and by the advent of the bomb. He begins with Trumans concerns about the Russians when he overlyk over from FDR.As he prepargond for his first clashing with a USSR representative Truman declare that if the Russians did not care to cooperate, they could go to hell. A few hours later, the professorship denotative the same view to Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov in sort of un diplomatic terms. Truman desired to continu e FDRs policy of cooperation with the Russians, unless his bearing when he spoke the above words were not the result of a moments flash of temper. Problems were developing over the USSRs dealings with Poland. Alperovitzs aboriginal melodic phrase that the bomb had a very significant influence on American views of diplomacy with the USSR long before the bomb.The bomb was inextricably bound with Trumans strategy at Potsdam in July 1945 and was regarded as a master card of diplomacy. (Alperovitz, p. 1) Alperovitz states that a major motive the bomb was used was to nock Russia much manageable. (Alperovitz, p. 1). Touched upon the trespass of nuclear mail on the beginning of the Cold War. In August 1945, Eisenhower matte that before the atom bomb was used, I would have said yes, I was sure we could keep peace with Russia.Now, I dont knowPeople are frightened and disturbed all over. Everyone feels insecure again. (Alperovitz, p. 2) Truman and or so members of his cabinet belie ved that Russia was attempting to look across Eastern Europe so concerns over Poland had been chosen as a symbolic issue to force a coming upon with Stalin because of Trumans concern that Stalin was had send offs for all of Eastern and Central Europe. (Alperovitz, p. 70) secretarial assistant Forrestal stated, This difficulty over Poland could not be treated as an isolated incident. (Alperovitz, p. 70) Forrestal argued We had better have a show down contendd(a) with them now rather than later. (Alperovitz, p. 70)On the surface, this showdown strategy seemed to have been a complete reversal of FDRs policy only a few weeks earlier. on that point were three major obstacles to Trumans degenerate, showdown approach. First, FDR appeared to have had a strong article of faith that cooperation with Russia was realizable. Second was the concern that American-Soviet cooperation capacity be destroyed and that a fo below peace accord amid Germany and the USSR force be signed, a conc ern that was eliminated when the German government collapsed. The third concern was that a showdown with Russia might result in the loss of Soviet help in the war against japan.While Trumans approach was one of an immediate showdown with Stalin, British undercoat Minister Winston Churchill took a different approach. He believed it might be possible to obtain additional concessions from the Russians if he could honor the extended troop mails rather than withdrawing Anglo-American man as valet de chambrewide Eisenhower had proposed. (Alperovitz, p. 90)Churchill was prepared to use any argument at his disposal to persuade Truman to his point. Churchill cabled Truman, The Russian occupational zone has the smallest symmetricalness of tribe and grows by far-off the largest proportion of foodBefore we move from the tactical plazas we have at present achieved, the Russians should be forced to total that the feeding of the German population must be treated as a whole and that the available supplies must be divided pro rata between the occupational zones. (Alperovitz, p. 91) When Truman took up the issue with his Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice, they were backward to use troop positions for political purposes.Even though Truman recognized that the Russians were in a strong position, he followed the showdown on Poland with a firm approach to the problem of cooperation in Central Europe. (Alperovitz, p. 93) Trumans joint action with Churchill punctuate his willingness to present a united Anglo-American stand against Russia. Like General Eisenhower, dissimilar war machine authorities believed that this approach to the troop issue would yield cast out results. By mid-May 1945, Trumans plan for cooperative fake of Central Europe was confront with a direct challenge.On April 24 1945, one day later(prenominal) president Truman had a showdown with Molotov, Secretary of War Stimson wrote president Truman stating, (The nuclear bomb) has such a bearing on our present foreign relations and such an important effect upon all my thinking in this electron orbit that I think you should know about it without further sustain. (Alperovitz, pp. 103-04) Up to this point, President was apparently unaware of the bomb.Stimson had casually mentioned to Truman about an immense come across(that) was under officea project looking to the development of a sassy explosive of al near unbelievable destructive originator, Stimson had felt no obligate reason or need to fully discuss the matter with President Truman up to that time until after the showdown with Molotov. (Alperovitz, p. 104) Secretary Stimson discussed the atomic bomb with the President for three quarters of an hour and it was expectnot resolutethat the bomb would be used. Truman was do aware that Japan had been the target of the limb development program and that a special Air Force root word was about to leave for its overseas base.Although Stimson expressed confidence that the b omb would edit out the war, the use of the bomb against Japan was not main subject of discussion. The diplomatic implications of the atomic bomb dominated private discussion between Stimson and Truman during the last-place week of April and the first week of May, 1945. President Truman eventually came to agree that the atomic bomb would have decisive implications for diplomacy with Russia. By shortly after April 25, 1945, British representatives k crude that a committee would be set up to consider the whole ranged of political issues which will arise in connection with the atomic bomb. (Alperovitz, p. 110)News of the atomic bomb first came to the average American and to most senior government officials from the rude(a)spapers. The subdivisions originator was disclosed in a way that produced great emotion and optimism about its usefulness as an instrument of broad(prenominal) policy. (Alperovitz, p. 237) On August 16, 1945, after the bomb was used and the war ended, Truman told the press, that Japan would not be divided into occupation zones, and declared that as far as Japan was concerned, in the event of any difference of ruling (among the Allied powers) the policies of the United States will govern. (Alperovitz, p. 240)The atomic bomb had strengthened the American hand in diplomacy. In the whirlwind days immediately after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American diplomacy changedswiftly. Secretary Byrnes underscored the breadth and scope of the departures from typical diplomacy by scaning, Thosedayswere full of action. The sheer volume of shit caused the Secretary of State to ask that the London foreign ministers meeting set for September 1 be postponed until September 10. (Alperovitz, p. 243).Truman declared The atomic bomb is too spartan to be loose in a lawless domainWe must constitute ourselves trustees of this new forceThe best pursuances of the United States require the utmost cooperation by all concerned in keeping secret now and for all time in the future all scientific and practiced information. (Alperovitz, p. 243) One week later, Truman directed that no information on the nuclear development project be released without the specific approval of the President. (Alperovitz, p. 243)Alperovitz distinctly points out that the atomic bomb and the temporary American monopoly in possessing the bomb was viewed as a great advantage to American diplomacy. In (Secretary Byrnes) view, the primary project was to establish a lasting structure of peaceA stable Europe, essential to world peace and American security alike, was the number-one goal.Byrnes believed that the nuclear monopoly could be maintained for at least seven years deep down that period, with the support of the revolutionary ordnance, his diplomacy could easily achieve its idealistic objectives. Thus, the weapon system seemed a crucial factor in forcing agreement to an American plan for permanent peacea plan which, ipso facto, would prevent an some other world war. ( Alperovitz, p. 245) Alperovitz goes on to add that Byrnes vision obviated the danger of an arms race. (Alperovitz, p. 245) Hi fib has shown that Byrnes was clear wrong. Not only did the atomic bomb fail to eliminate the arms race, but it seems to have added to the race tremendously, but with all that was at stake, the bomb made going to war a much more dotty proposition than it had been in the past.J. Samuel Walkers book egg on and Utter Destruction focused on another aspect of the new weapon. Walker notes in his stick in that, The question of why President Truman used atomic bombs against Japan has intrigued me since I was an undergraduate history major. Indeed, it was the first issue in which the competing arguments of different scholars caught my interest. (Walker, p. ix)This statement in his preface sets up the direction for his book. Walker states, In factTruman never faced a categorical choice between the bomb and an invasion that would cost hundreds of thousands of Ameri can livesthe prevailing perception (about the presidents alternatives) immensely oversimplifies the situation in the summer of 1945. (Walker, p. 5)Walker points out 1) that there were other available options for a reasonably short time end to the war without resorting to the bomb, 2) Truman and his key advisers believed that Japan was so weak that the war could end even before an invasion began and 3) American military machine planners believed that even in a worst case scenario, American casualties would be far fewer than the hundreds of thousands Truman and his advisers claimed after the war. So, Was the use of the bomb necessary at all and if so, 2) What exactly did it effectuate?Walker begins by taking a look at the President. Truman win greater affection and esteem from the American people after his organization and after he died than he had while president. He was honest, often indiscreet and blunt and needlessly offensive and his decisiveness could lead to superficial or impulsive judgments. (p. 7)The world was embroiled in a global war that made his arrival into the Oval Office a period of extraordinarily difficult problems and, even though he had been vice president, he came to the whiten House without adequate preparation. Indeed, he began his turn at the helm essentially in the dark about many of his predecessors policies and commitments. (Walker, p. 9) The one fundamental military strategy from Roosevelt that seemed clear to Truman was his predecessors desire to achieve complete victory at the lowest cost in American lives. (Walker, p. 9)After October 1941, President Roosevelt allow a major travail to explore the feasibility of an atomic bomb. The Manhattan project began with the purpose of addressing the bewildering variety of scientific and engineering uncertainties connected with nuclear verve and the bomb. Once scientists had proven that a nuclear chain reaction was possible, the Manhattan pouch focused on designing a bomb and produci ng the fuel to make it work.All of this was kept secret from Vice President Truman, so when he suddenly became President, he knew virtually nothing about the Manhattan Project or the bomb even though he had larn of a large and highly secret effort to build a new weapon while he was chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the internal Defense Program in the Senate. However, while serving as a senator he did not observe any details.Secretary Stimson confirmed and expound information about the bomb to the President in a meeting on April 25, 1945, but Secretary Stimson warned, the existence of such a weapon would create pro constitute problems because the United States would not be able to maintain a monopoly on the technology. Further, the issue of sharing information about the atomic bomb would snuff it a primary question of our foreign relations. (Walker, p. 13)When Truman took office, he was outraged by the Soviet conduct in Poland, but he did not want to ruin the rel atively good relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Germany retracted on May 8, 1945, less than a month after Truman became president, but the war in Japan raged on. Americans were still illogical about the attack on Pearl Harbor and had also become outraged when the U.S. government learned about how the Nipponese mistreated American prisoners and released that information to the public and the Japanese were equally as disdainful of Americans give thanks to the warped stereotypes Japanese leaders painted of Americans during the war. So, the Americans fought a war without pardon in Japan. (Walker, p. 23)Even though the Japanese people were losing confidence in their leaders and public morale was deteriorating, the fact that Japan was on the bourne of defeat did not mean that the rural area was on the verge of surrender. By the end of June 1945, both American and Japanese leaders, including Japans emperor, as well as the Japanese people realized that the war would end in Japans defeat. On June 17, 1945, President Truman wrote in his diary that deciding between invading Japan and relying solely on bombing and blockade to end the war was his hardest stopping point to date. ( Walker, p. 35)Advisers in the Truman administration realized that there was a large subaquatic class in Japan that did not favor the war but would fight tenaciously for their homeland. In a meeting on June 18, 1945, Secretary Stimson hinted that he conception the war might end by some other means, though at this time he did not specify what the alternatives were. (Walker, p. 37)Meanwhile, although there were some proponents who were in favor of moderating the stance for Japans crude(prenominal) surrender, the prevailing mental attitude in the United States as a whole was for the unconditional surrender of Japan. By July 13, 1945, it was clear that Americas demand for an unconditional surrender was the main obstacle to a settlement. So, despite the coarse desire s of the American people and the Japanese people for peace and the leaders of both countries faced the same obstacleunconditional surrender.President Truman faced choices as to how to overcome this dilemma. There were three choices, including invasions with the potentially high costs. A fourth alternative also existed, the atomic bomb. Truman and his advisers proceeded with their readying as if the bomb didnt exist because the bomb had not been auditioned successfully, but those in the administration who knew about the bomb hoped that a successful test would lead to their goal of remainder the war at a start cost than the alternatives.Final preparations for the atomic test, named Trinity proceeded amid strain, excitement, uncertainty and ominous live forecasts, but at 800 AM on July 16, 1945, Secretary Stimson receive news of the successful test of the bomb. President Truman was delighted when he comprehend the news. Secretary Byrnes was committed to the belief that the bomb would be an instrument to go up American diplomacy, particularly in light of growing differences with the Soviet Union.On the diplomatic front, Truman took his cue from Secretary Byrnes and agree that the bomb would serve as a valuable tool for diplomacy. Ultimately, it appears that Truman used the bomb because he had no compelling reason to avoid employ it. (Walker, p. 95) American leaders had assumed that the bomb would be used when available and there were no military, diplomatic, political, or moral considerations contrary to that assumption. Diplomatically, it placed America in a stronger position with the Soviets and it was politically popular as a means in ending the war pronto as opposed to the dire prospects of victory without the bomb.Herbert Feis opens his work by considering how the war could be ended. In May 1945 the war in Europe was over and Japan fought alone. Japanese life and production was being smashed and burned. The question was, How could (the war) be ended surely and quickly? (Feis, p. 3) The obvious and perhaps most certain was was to beat down the Japanese until they could no longer fight onby enlarging the assaults on Japan and Japanese armed forces wherever they could be reached (Feis, p. 3) Another means was by inducement and a third, the most secret, was by shock. individually of these approaches could end the war or two or three of them could do so in combination.The end of the European war made American, British and Russian troops available for use in the Pacific. As for the war in the General Marshall felt that the hope that air power alone would be able to drive Japan out of the war was unjustified and that the task would be the more difficult there since the Japanese were scattered by means of mountainous country. (Feis, p. 9) The U.S. had planned an invasion of Kyushu, but there were concerns that America could not go further and force its way upon Tokyo. (Feis, p. 11) The Joint Chiefs adopted strategic plans for the wa r in the Pacific on May 25, 1945.Those plans were approved by President Truman on June 18th, but those plans included the desire to have Russian forces enter the final assault with U.S. forces. General MacArthur emphatically stated to a visitor from the War Department that no attempt ought to be made to invade Japan proper unless and until the Russian army had been previously committed to action in Manchuria that he though this was essential, and should be brought about withoutdelay. President Trumans tone was stern. He felt that Japanese aggression against China, the Japanese assault upon America and the Japanese cruelties during the was warranted severity and he reaffirmed his intention to stretch forth on the war until the Japanese military and naval forces lay down their arms in unconditional surrender. (Feis, p. 16)On the morning of May 28, 1945, President Truman was urged to try to induce the Japanese to surrender by dispelling the worst fears of the consequences. Secretary S timson and General Marshall concluded that the question of what to say to the Japanese and when to say it, should be governed by whether and when the United States had the atomic bomb. (Feis, p. 19) Others in the cabinet did not believe that Japan would heed any warnings of surrender until the Japanese were more thoroughly beaten down. (Feis, p. 19)Although the prime incentive for making the bomb was the effort to defeat Germany (Feis, p. 28), the dimensions of creating the bomb became apparent and its creators were compelled to face the fact that the war against Germany might be over before the bomb was ready for use. The number of issues border the creation of the bomb included what type of bomb to make.During the creation of the bomb, those in the Roosevelt administration who knew about it believed that knowledge needed to make the new weapon could be confined long enough as to allow the United States and Britain to secure an advantage that would keep the Soviet Union from being too pushy. When Roosevelt died, Secretary Stimson lingered after the first Cabinet meeting to tell the new President briefly about the immense undertaking regarding the bomb of which the motive vice president now president had no knowledge.As Truman learned more about the weapon with time, Truman began to recognize the enormous significance of the new weapon. The President accepted Secretary Stimsons belief that our leadership in the war and the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any contingency to civilization which it would further. (Feis, p. 38)When plans to use the bomb were considered, one consideration was to demonstrate the bombs power before using it, but there were concerns against its use. The possibility that a country could assure its security by increasing its nuclear armaments (as was later the practice) was viewed to be invalid. It was felt that the safety of al l nations henceforth could be achieved only if they agreed to subject their activities in atomic energy to international control.However, the chance of legal transfer about such an agreement would be greatly lessened by the sudden and unannounced use of the weapon against Japan. Both the diplomatic and military value of the bomb spanned a wide range of concerns. Using the bomb against Japan faced a range of concerns as evidenced by the following statement they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of military application best designed to induce surrender.Those who urge on a purely technical demonstration of atomic weapons, and have feared that if they would entreat to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of pitch American lives by immediate military use. (Feis, p. 54)Before using the new weapon, Americans were determi ned to continue their assault on Japan and officials in Washington were striving to compose a statement which would tell the Japanese how we intended to treat them once they surrendered.(Feis, p. 63) Feis considers issues not discussed by the other authors. He wonders, Whether, if the United States had pledged itself as soon as the war was over to destroy the other bombs it had and dismantle the factories in which they were made other countries would have been willing to join with it in a trustworthy system of control of atomic energy, must remain forever a provocation to the big historian. (Feis, p. 190)I could be biased by this, but I surely enjoyed each of these books, however I must admit to a great interest in many aspects of World War II, including matters border the atomic bomb. These books covered an aspect of the war that took concerns of future wars to a new and scare level and often placed the reader right in the summary of issues and diplomacy connected with the atom ic bomb and other issues of the war. All three books discuss the global atmosphere at the time of a world in turmoil at the end of World War II and the bombs contribution that bringing that turmoil to an end, but at the same time, each of the books focus on aspects of the politics surrounding the bomb.All name the mutual suspicion and mistrust between Russia and her two strongest allies in the War, the U.S. and Britain. They reveal how this mistrust played a role in the development, use and politics surrounding the bomb. Each book portrays different details surrounding the development and use of the bomb. Although or perhaps despite their different perspectives, all three books are interesting and had some surprizingly similar aspects. Each author tells his story from a different perspective, each author outlines some aspects of their story with common events and from common perspectives.Alperovitz seems to focus a lot on Trumans concern regarding Stalins desires for Poland and oth er areas of Eastern Europe. Walker focused a great deal on events in the Pacific and Feis tended to concentrate much more of his focus on the development of the bomb. Combined, these three books present an interesting and a more encompassing look at how the bomb developed, its initial influence on diplomacy and how politicians felt that the existence of the bomb would impact future events in Europe.Each author tells an interesting and provacotive story with behind the scenes details from a different perspective and each author lays out interesting and compelling facts surrounding the concerns, suspicions and global politics between Russia and ther wartime allies, the United States and Great Britain. I found each of them to be interesting and compelling reading.ReferencesAlperoitz, Gar (1965). Atomic diplomacy Hiroshima and Potsdam the use of the atomic bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet power . New York, NY Simon and Schuster.Feis, Herbert (1966). The Atomic Bomb and t he End of World War II. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.Walker, J. Samuel (1997). Prompt and utter destruction Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan. Chapel Hill, NC University of North Carolina Press.